Macedonia: Light at the End of a Tunnel Too Far

Photo: Twitter/United For Macedonia

Update on April 28, 2017:

The crowd of the VMRO-DPMNE supporters attacked the Macedonian Parliament, beat-up couple of MPs from the opposition camp and occupied it for few hours in reaction to the election of the new Speaker.

On April 27, 2017 the Macedonian Parliament managed to break the obstruction of the VMRO-DPMNE minority, who were clogging the parliament discussion for weeks with “filibustering tactics”, and finally voted the new speaker of the Parliament. The new Speaker who has arisen from very tensed voting and gained support of all 67 members of the SDSM and Albanian parties coalition is Talat Xhaferi, Albanian MP from political party DUI. After the vote of the new Speaker was announced, crowds of VMRO-DPMNE nationalist supporters, who have been continuously protesting in front of the Parliament for weeks, broke the police cordons and occupied it for couple of hours. Police put virtually no fight in the first moments to prevent them from doing so. The crowd, which consisted of also number of balaclava-clad hooligans, started to attack SDSM as well as Albanian MPs ending with 4 of them wounded, including Prime-Minister-to-be Zoran Zaev, leader of the SDSM. Police intervened just hours later, clearing the Parliament building from protesters later in the night. Both the EU as well as the US called for calm and restrain, strongly denouncing the use of violence and recognized Talat Xhaferi as the new Speaker of the Macedonian Parliament.

This unfortunate development could only deepen the internal-political crisis in Macedonia, there is a threat it will spin totally out of control and raise inter-ethnic tensions. Up until this point the crisis was political, though VMRO-DPMNE has been waging a fear campaign over possibility of Albanians getting more rights, threatening that it will mean the end of Macedonia and its split along the ethnic lines. The Albanian minority was not responding to these provocations until now and showed restrain. However, last night also couple of Albanian MPs were beaten by the nationalistic crowd.

At this point the most important will be the reaction of the EU and the US as their actions until now during the whole crisis were relatively moderate and only at the level of declarations. This has embolden VMRO-DPMNE leaders to step-up their pressure and block forming of the new government under the SDSM leadership and de-facto holding on to power. Declaring support for the new Speaker of the Parliament is just a beginning – now more clearer messages towards the VMRO-DPMNE must follow, as there is a threat that violence could repeat, if the SDSM will try to vote confidence of the new government in the Parliament. The EU and the US should consider using of targeted sanctions against some of the key VMRO-DPMNE figures to prevent the political situation deteriorate into something even worse.

The original blog published on March 30, 2017:

At the latest European Council meeting, the leaders of the EU member countries felt the need to reiterate the EU’s commitment for countries of the Western Balkans with integration ambitions due to the recent development in the region. One of the reasons why the Western Balkans was again on the “menu” was the situation in Macedonia.   

How it all began, anyway?

Macedonia has been experiencing deep internal political crisis since parliamentary and presidential elections in April 2014. The opposition accused then government parties, that they consolidated power through mass election frauds. In response, the opposition boycotted the Parliament sessions. The crisis significantly deepened in February 2015, when the opposition started to publish wire-tapping records, provided them by an anonymous leaker(s), originating from the Macedonian secret police UBK, collected over years during tenures of the Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski’s party VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) Governments (2006 – 2016). They included phone-discussions among highest state representatives discussing highly politically sensitive matters, own involvement in criminal cases as well as outright corruption.

The revelation of high-level corruption led to anti-government protests under the leadership of – then - strongest opposition party SDSM (Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia) requesting the Gruevski’s Government to step down, declare snap elections and secure proper investigation of numerous criminal and corruption cases revealed in the wire-taps. The Government resisted and the protests escalated with thousands of people from both camps protesting against or in support of the Government. Opposition staged the occupation protest lasting for weeks in front of the Government building in Skopje. The response to the internal crisis in Macedonia from the international community including the EU was at this point weak.

Then in May 2015, special police raid in Kumanovo – ethnically mixed city – against group of Albanian suspects got wrong, turned into blood-shed that cost lives of at least 10 persons and dozens of wounded. This was probably the wake-up call for the international community, that became concerned that blood could be again spilled in the Balkans and that the inter-ethnic tensions, that are still subliminally present in Macedonia, could flame up. The EU and the U.S. diplomacies have put themselves into mediating the agreement between the Government and the Opposition. The result of lengthy negotiations was a compromise called “Pržino Agreement” concluded in July 2015.

The Agreement envisaged: return of the opposition to the Parliament; early elections to take place in April 2016, before that Prime Minister Gruevski will step down in January 2016 and the mixed care-taker Government consisting of representatives from both camps will lead the country towards the early elections. Apart from that the Special Prosecutor’s Office was established, whose main role is the investigation of criminal cases, that were mentioned in leaked wire-taps.

The implementation of the Agreement was protracted, with opposition blaming the VMRO-DPMNE for delays and obstructions. Subsequently the early elections were postponed first for June 5 and finally took place on December 11, 2016. The time between April and December 2016 was filled with mass protests, organized by the Macedonian civil society and supported by the political opposition, requesting the VMRO-DPMNE to live up to terms of the Pržino agreement.


Not quite “early” elections

After heated and polarised pre-election campaign, the votes were organised on 11 December. The elections ended up with a tie – opposition SDSM earned just two seats less than the winning VMRO-DPMNE (51 seats) out of 120 seats total in the Parliament. Four more parties passed the threshold – all of them smaller ethnic Albanian parties: Democratic Union for Integration (DUI, former junior coalition partner of VMRO-DPMNE in previous government coalition); newly founded conservative “Besa Movement”; coalition “Alliance for Albanians” and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). Right after the elections, it became clear that the key to any post-election government coalition have Albanian ethnic political parties. This situation favoured the SDSM, who went to the elections as universal social-democratic party, not restricted to the ethnicity and actually lots of Albanians voted for them. On the other hand, VMRO-DPMNE ran the campaign on Macedonian nationalistic sentiments and that alienated some of their potential coalition partners.

Nikola Gruevski as the leader of winning party was given the mandate to form the government, however, failed to secure majority within the 20 days’ deadline, because they didn’t find agreement with the former coalition partner DUI. He returned the mandate, but President Gjorge Ivanov in a surprising turn of events did not give mandate to the leader of the second strongest party - Zoran Zaev of the SDSM. Rather he declared that for the sake of stability and unity of Macedonia, he will give mandate only to that political leader who will bring him signatures of at least 61 MPs. Zaev entered into lengthy negotiations with Albanian parties represented in the Parliament, now united as the “Albanian Platform” around joint goal to improve status of Albanians in Macedonia.

They found common grounds and so Zaev headed to the Presidential Palace with signatures of 67 MPs from SDSM, DUI, BESA and the Alliance of Albanians. Two days later, President Ivanov in another change of mind announced, that he still cannot grant the mandate to Zaev, because part of his government would be “foreign country’s platform”, apparently in reference to the “Albanian platform”. Parallel with that the VMRO-DPMNE supporters launched series of country-wide protests against potential “SDSM – Albanian platform” government coalition, saying it would lead to “con-federalisation” and subsequently “dissipation of Macedonia” along the ethnic lines. Instead, VMRO-DPMNE calls for another early election to take place in May 2017 along with the planned municipal elections in order citizens distribute votes anew. SDSM and Albanian parties oppose, quoting the Constitution they were supposed to get the mandate from the President to form the Government as they declared clear majority.

Therefore, the country is currently in a stalemate and the crisis is just deepening. There is still the interim Government, the Parliament has not yet met though it is already over 3 months after the elections, legislative process is stopped, protests in streets continue and the inter-ethnic tension is growing. All representatives of the EU and the U.S. called upon the President Ivanov repeatedly to give the mandate to the party that obtained the support of majority in the elections.

The VMRO-DPMNE called it “mingling into the internal affairs of a sovereign state”. This narrative was quickly picked up by Russia, warning against “Western interference into domestic affairs of Macedonia” and declaring support to the VMRO-DPMNE and the President Ivanov. From Russian side, it was yet another cold calculus – on one hand could poke the EU and the West over their efforts in the Western Balkans, and on the other hand, it sowed discontent among segments of Macedonian society as well as other countries in the region.

What could be the way out of the crisis?

The SDSM and its allies are trying to by-pass Presidential de-facto veto on government forming, through the Parliament. For that, they would need to convene the Parliament and elect the Speaker. After that, they might try to initiate the vote of confidence for the proposed cabinet consisting of SDSM and Albanian parties’ representatives. However, the SDSM speaks about this scenario just as the “Plan B”. They still hope President Ivanov will change his mind, honour the Constitution and grant the mandate to form the Government to Zaev.

Conclusions

There are number of root causes of the current political crisis in Macedonia. First and foremost, strong political polarisation and deep distrust between the SDSM and the VMRO-DPMNE. SDSM gained in the early elections quite decent support and above expectations also Albanian votes. On the other hand, VMRO-DPMNE and its former coalition partner DUI – experienced significant loss in support. For the SDSM, it is “now or never” opportunity to form and lead the Government of Macedonia. For VMRO-DPMNE, it would mean straight way to opposition and for many of its representatives possibly to jail, if corruption and criminal cases that were leaked in wire-taps’ recordings would be properly investigated and prosecuted. That is a pretty good motivation to try to stay in power at all costs.

Secondly, there is still potential inter-ethnic tension and this could deepen with protests and activities of Macedonian nationalists against representation of Albanians in the Government. It is worth noting, that when VMRO-DPMNE was negotiating with DUI about creation of the coalition, there were no protests against that, though DUI voiced the same requirements as it tabled later for talks with the SDSM in regard to strengthening the position of Albanians in Macedonia.

Thirdly, the international context has also significant impact on development of the crisis. The EU and the U.S. actively engaged to find the solution out of the crisis already back in 2015. But their influence weakened over time. The Presidential elections in the U.S. brought the new Administration, that has not showed too much of interest in the Western Balkans or Macedonia. The EU’s position has been weakened as well – with Brexit and migration crisis. Apart from that, there is the ongoing dispute between Macedonia and Greece over the so-called “name issue“, due to which Greece has been blocking the integration process of Macedonia both to the EU and the NATO. Protracted disagreement on how should the country be called, caused significant delays in country’s European integration. Coupled with above-mentioned crisis, caused that EU lost much of its leverage, it possesses in form of the integration perspective and transformation. Now it seems that the carrot is too far and the stick too small for the VMRO-DPMNE or the President Ivanov to honour the Constitution and the will of the democratically elected majority. With the lack (or not enough) of pressure from abroad to help to solve the political crisis in Macedonia – it seems that the light at the end of the tunnel is still too far.

Ján Cingel

Acting Head of the European Neighbourhood Programme

GLOBSEC Policy Institute

EU disturbed by new Balkan instability and geopolitics: hidden contradictions

(Photo: European Commission)

After an extended absence, the EU summit on 9 March 2017 finally included the current state of the Western Balkans in its agenda. The common point of reference for this ‘inner courtyard’ of Europe has been its slow-moving progress towards the EU accession. However, now for the first time in many years, geopolitical and security threats facing this fragile region have risen to the top of the agenda.

The EU summit conclusions expressed concern on both external and internal factors, referring to a recent flare-up in nationalist rhetoric and ethnic tensions in this post-conflict region. European Council President Donald Tusk was quoted as saying some of the ethnic divisions that have existed in several countries for some time have spiked due to destabilizing external influences. This was a veiled reference to Russia, which has been waging wider disinformation campaigns in Serbia and elsewhere in the region. Tusk also called for EU institutions to take more action, including in the area of strategic communications.

The reasons are simple: an erosion of strategic engagement, attention and political will in key EU capitals. While Europe neglects the Balkans, and the new U. S. Administration reorients foreign policy, other powers moved in to fill the vacuum. This post-conflict corner in south eastern Europe has again become a zone for competing geopolitical struggles.

The EU Observer correctly noted that the EU capitals are also wary of Turkey and Gulf Arab states’ efforts to increase political influence in the region, but Russia’s behaviour is seen as more destabilising and dangerous. The Kremlin’s assertive presence in the Balkans presents a low-risk option for an early test of transatlantic relations under the new American President Donald Trump.

Multiple alarm bells

Multiple alarm bells have sounded in recent weeks and months. The real game changer in the outside perception of Moscow’s meddling in the region was an attempted coup in Montenegro during parliamentary elections in October 2016. Many observers were initially sceptical about the official claims from Podgorica that local security service narrowly prevented a group of Serbian ultranationalists and paramilitary fighters (with recent experience from the Donbass) organized from Russia from storming the parliament and helping to disrupt the elections, and thus discredit the ratification process of Montenegro’s membership in NATO. Then Montenegro presented evidence, which was partly gathered thanks to cooperation with Serbian authorities (the perpetrators initially operated from Serbian territory). Pro-Russian opposition parties still bitterly contest the claim. Nevertheless, presented evidence confirms the long-term trend. This was also pointed out by British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson who only a few days ago openly called on the Kremlin to stop undermining pro-Western leaders and governments in the Balkans.

Of more immediate concern is the deep, prolonged crisis gripping Macedonia. With street protests in Skopje and a constitutional crisis over the results of the December election, Russian government and media have claimed that the EU is trying to create a Greater Albania – a clear attempt to aggravate ethnic tension in this fragile country with a 25% ethnic Albanian minority, playing into the hands of former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski who is trying to remain in power. Russia is also backing another controversial strongman, the nationalist president of Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian Serb entity, who is pushing for a referendum on RS independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Return of geopolitics benefited Balkan strongmen

This return of geopolitics, however, has also benefited Balkan leaders, allowing them to pander to various geopolitical players or investors, and play this ‘chess game’ as a cover for expanding their own power and patronage networks. They can more easily disregard democratic standards and politically conditionality, which has always been part of the EU’s enlargement process (when it still had more credibility).

Nowhere else is this contradiction more clearly displayed than in Serbia - the largest Balkan country, which is now the lynchpin of stability for the whole region. The pro-EU course, which has long dominated Belgrade’s geostrategic orientation, has recently been confronted with a growing Russian influence in domestic politics, business and public opinion. However, events in Montenegro seemed to reach a tipping point: Serbia’s Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic, who has evolved from a former hard-line nationalist into a pro-EU leader and pragmatist, took it as a warning.

Serbia as trendsetter?

After period characterized by rumours and speculation, 47-year old Vucic decided to run in Presidential elections in April 2017. He thus outmanoeuvred the current president Tomislav Nikolic, a key ally of Moscow. 65-years old Nikolic was former political mentor of Vucic, and a founder of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). At the same time, he has remained a traditional hard-line nationalist with strong ties to Russia. He once famously said that the only thing he loves more than Russia, is Serbia.

Vucic knows that trading the top government job for a mostly ceremonial position of President with few constitutional powers does not matter. If he finds a suitable replacement as Prime Minister, even as President he will remain the country’s strongman. It is in line with Serbian political tradition inherited from the era of Tito and Milosevic (when informal power mattered much more than formal competences and institutions).

Meanwhile, the fragmented Serbian democratic camp has failed to present a single candidate: three contenders are now competing for similar voters in what is more a side-show beauty pageant for the leader of the opposition and chief opponent to Vucic. His election for Serbian President is already taken as a foregone conclusion. There are two open questions: whether Prime Minister Vucic will win a straight majority already in the first round, and if not, who would be his contender in a run-off. A second round of elections would be somewhat humiliating for Vucic. The effect of a split vote among the mainstream opposition might help the notorious extreme nationalist leader Vojislav Seselj. In a way, he would be the ideal opponent for both Prime Minister Vucic and Russia. Moscow initially preferred the status quo (new mandate for President Nikolic) but now would be satisfied with boosting their preferred narrative (e.g. Serbia betrayed by the West should turn to Russia) during the election campaign using the platform of hardline nationalists.

Business as usual won’t work

As much as the EU (as well as the new U. S. Administration) now rely on Vucic, they can’t ignore his increasingly undemocratic track record, especially when global and regional influences encourage him to tighten his trip. At the same time, the EU’s leverage is not something to be ignored. While Brussels and Berlin need him as partner on strategic regional issues, migration, and Kosovo, it also goes the other way around: Serbia’s evasive strongman also needs the EU, and Berlin and Washington in particular, to calm the waters, keep Russia at bay and credibly reengage the whole region.

To sum up: the latest EU summit was a step in the right direction if it is not followed by complacency. Continuing with a ‘business as usual’ approach to the Balkans will not work anymore as competing geopolitical struggles take the main stage.

Milan Nič
Head of Future of Europe Programme

GLOBSEC Policy Institute

Four factors threatening our freedom and democracy

(Photo: VOA)

The world is at the crossroads of history and the effects of events that are now happening in Europe and across the Atlantic affect everyone, whether they realize it or not. Series of events that dominated the headlines and public debate in the past year - the migration crisis, Brexit or election of Donald Trump for president of the USA shook the foundations of mechanisms and institutions maintaining stability and security of Europe and the world as we know it. What future lies ahead of the liberal democracy and its institutions? The causes, impacts and possibilities of future development of the current situation have been covered in hundreds of analyses, but it seems that the “wind of change” is blowing in the entire western hemisphere. What kind of change it will be and what will follow next, when the pillars of stability and security would fall, we know very little of.

In the information noise and the small details flooding our daily newsfeeds, some very important facts and trends are lost. What might look from the outside as a spontaneous and natural mood change throughout the western societies is actually happening due to several driving factors. I would like to highlight four specific factors: the technological change, return of Russian superpower ambitions, use of big data for individualised political marketing and the crisis of traditional media. 

Technological change

The first driving factor is the technology revolution related to the massive spread of internet access. Expansion of the Internet coverage combined with availability of devices (low-cost smartphones) and social networking has radically changed the way of communication between political leaders and their voters. It also fundamentally altered the possibilities for mobilizing and connecting people around themes or interests. When this process began, everyone hoped that immediate mass access to knowledge accumulated by generations of mankind will lead to more informed citizens and better decisions of all. Today we are talking of post-factual reality, fake news and relativisation or even denial of the existence of objective reality.

Gerasimov's doctrine and hybrid threats

"Russia is waging the most amazing information war blitzkrieg, we have ever seen in the history of information warfare" Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO Wales Summit, September 2014.

The second factor, until the presidential elections in the US almost neglected, was a gradual return of superpower ambitions of the Russian Federation and the related systematic measures by Kremlin aimed at weakening and disruption of key institutions of the West. When Valery Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of the Russian Army published an article on non-linear war in 2013, later called the Gerasimov's doctrine, it was the only official recognition of what we call hybrid threats today. 

According to official estimates, the Russian Federation is spending on such activities 1 billion Euro a year. By comparison, the EEAS (European External activities) which is the only department established to monitor and balance such activities within the EU has not received the promised increase in the budget to 800 thousand Euro. For every € 1,000 spent on Russia as its propaganda effect, the EU spends 0.8 Euro. With few exceptions, there are no capacities at national level dealing with hybrid threats.

Psychometrics and individualised political marketing

The third factor, which only gradually becomes apparent is the use of big data and online profiles for political marketing, customized according to personal characteristics of individuals. “Until the 2016 US presidential elections, political campaigns were based on demographic concepts and candidates attempted to reach a comprehensive electoral groups defined by gender, ethnicity, religion, or region,”  said Alexander Nix, a man with huge influence, yet almost unknown to the public. He is a man who is the architect behind the success of Brexit, as well as victory of Donald Trump. His company developed a unique technology that combines personality analysis (Psychometrics) with the individualization of political messages on social networks.

What seemed a few years ago as a science fiction, became reality in Brexit and the US presidential elections. Cambridge Analytica have developed and successfully tested in practice a method that allows to predict the personality of each and every individual in the United States. This is possible, since many of our personal data are available for sale and are used to establish a basic personality profile. This is then linked to data on voters lists for the Republican or the Democratic Party and those from Facebook and other social networks. The resulting profile is incredibly detailed and precise to permit precisely targeted advertising, including political messages.  Cambridge Analytica became famous after supporting campaign to promote Brexit and later that year was hired by Donald Trump. Among its clients are Eurosceptic political forces in Italy or the National Front in France.

The crisis of the media and the emergence of alternative media

The fourth factor which led us to the current crisis (although, of course, the list is much longer) is the massive change in the way people receive information. Hierarchical model – we (media professionals) create the content, and you (the public) consume it - is increasingly being challenged and replaced by online media. According to the survey by the Pew Research Center 44% of Americans access the news through Facebook. Facebook thus became the de-facto media with a market share of 44 percent. According to GLOBSEC Trends opinion poll data, 26% of Czechs, 17% of Slovaks and 16% of Hungarians use so-called alternative media as their primary source of information.

Content of what everybody sees on his Facebook is different and consists of complex algorithms that support our existing opinions (based on past preferences) to display content that is consistent with them. The result is the so-called "filter bubbles" that enclosed us in a virtual bubble into which penetrate only messages, comments, statuses that are largely consistent with how we perceive the world. In practice, this leads to the situation that we are less exposed to different ideas, if we do not deliberately seek them. At the same time, discussions in cyberspace degenerated into personal attacks where online lynch squads are mobilised to attack their ideological opponents.

If we add the decline of the traditional media, which are struggling to survive and the boom in so-called fake news content based on lies and misrepresentation of reality, the outcome is polarization of society never seen in a modern history. In the world of social media, where people like and share the headlines and do not read long texts, where emotional video wins over an evidence-based analysis, it is the populists and extremists who thrive. They seized all the opportunities of this new reality and used the social media and fake news to make their case for a rearrangement of the society according to their perverted ideas.

Light at the end of the tunnel?

All these factors are also causing the counteraction - people who were previously apathetic are starting to realize what is at stake, create online communities of active citizens, committees to save the Democracy ( KOD in Poland ) and progressive movements of young people. The Russian propaganda and the threat of domestic extremists have awakened the sleeping politicians. At the same time, IT companies are starting to realize their power, position and responsibility they have and slowly fix the holes in their platforms that are being exploited by the enemies of democracy.

The question is who will win this race - forces of progressive change or those who seek to destroy the existing order. It is the role and responsibility of each of us, in our neighbourhood, on our Facebook walls, within our own capacities to contribute to a change that would not lead us to totalitarianism, injustice and conflict.

Daniel Milo
Head of Strategic Communication Programme

GLOBSEC Policy Institute

The Train to Nowhere – is Dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo approaching its Final Station?

Photo: Twitter/UNPOintl 

With 1 March 2017, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, started a Balkan tour of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia. The tour ended on March 4 and Mogherini is expected to brief EU foreign ministers on the visit at the Foreign Affairs Council on March 6. The Western Balkans is thus after long time receiving increased attention from the members of the EU. This is a good opportunity to look at the state of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia that was once considered a historic success of the EU, but is now facing a stalemate.

On 14 January 2017, a first train in 18 years left Belgrade and was planned to enter the city of Mitrovica in northern Kosovo. However, the long-awaited train connecting Kosovo and Serbia did not reach its final destination. It was stopped near the borders, in Raska. The reason was simple – the train was painted in the national colours of Serbia and it was written all over in 21 languages “Kosovo is Serbia”. The train provocation was connected to the coming presidential election in Serbia; however, the tension has been rising since December, when the Kosovo Serbs started to build a concrete wall near the bridge across the Ibar River in North Mitrovica. The train incident in many respects symbolises the process of normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Much like it happened with the train, there are doubts if the EU-mediated dialogue will ever reach its final destination – the actual normalisation of relations. With Serbia progressing in its EU accession talks (two new chapters opened in February) the pressure for this result will rise.

When the so-called Brussels process started on 8 March 2011, it was a considerable achievement itself. For the first time, Serbia agreed to address the issue of its former province outside the UN framework (where it enjoyed the support of Russia). The EU-facilitated dialogue was quickly considered as a vehicle that could succeed to bring about the normalisation of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia. On 19 April 2013, the EU celebrated a historic success in its role as mediator: the signing of the First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relation between Kosovo and Serbia. It was the first agreement between the two adversaries, i.e. not between just one of them and an international actor. However, four years have passed since the First Agreement was signed and the question about the real effects of the Brussels dialogue is more pressing than ever.

A closer look at the Brussels process would reveal that although important agreements were reached and relations on political level were eased; the reality is not as bright as the European Commission’s 2016 Report on Serbia and European Commission 2016 Report on Kosovo would suggest. The train incident is just one example of the state of affairs between the two former adversaries. Even when Pristina and Belgrade have agreed on something, the implementation dragged with both parties interpreting the agreement differently. Ambiguous language of mediated agreements that so creatively enabled initial contact and negotiations is also providing a space for both parties to understand them as they wish. 

There are many things that can be criticised on the EU-mediated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Ambiguity in language of the agreements, weak pressure on the signatories of the agreements, divisions among the EU members on the question of Kosovo statehood are just some of the main the problems. The truth is, if Kosovo and Serbia are not genuinely intent to normalise their relations, the EU cannot force them. Unfortunately, this intention from the sides of both adversaries seems to be lacking in the first place. The political will and power of both Kosovo's and Serbia's leaders is crucial for the success of the normalisation efforts.

Having said that, the implication that the EU mediation has not brought about any results is incorrect. Thanks to the dialogue, representatives of Serbia and Kosovo are speaking directly to each other, Kosovo has a dialing code, and life for ordinary citizens of Kosovo is somehow eased. Thanks to the EU, there is a dialogue that most probably would have otherwise not existed at all. Serbia and Kosovo lack internal motivation for normalisation and the allure of EU membership is the main thing that keeps them negotiating with each other.

After the presidential election in Serbia in April 2017, both sides will have to agree on the future of Association/Community of Serb Municipalities, an autonomous structure for the Serb majority municipalities in the north Kosovo. The agreement on Association/Community polarises public opinion in Kosovo and caused increased tension in the past. The negotiations about its future represent make-it-or-break-it moment for the whole dialogue.

The Brussels dialogue has not reached its final destination yet, but its continuation must be supported to bring about greater results. The distance between Kosovars and Serbs must be bridged and the whole dialogue must gain the legitimacy it needs the most. The civil society and citizens should be involved more in parallel actions that promote reconciliation and cooperation. In that way, the dialogue can be revived and have a chance to safely travel all to way up to its final destination. 

The article is part of the wider research supported by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society as part of the project “Building Knowledge of New Statehood in Southeast Europe: Understanding Kosovo's Domestic and International Policy Considerations" whose findings will be published soon.

Miroslava Kuľková