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| (Photo: European Commission) |
After an extended
absence, the EU summit on 9 March 2017 finally included the current state of
the Western Balkans in its agenda. The common point of reference for this
‘inner courtyard’ of Europe has been its slow-moving progress towards the EU
accession. However, now for the first time in many years, geopolitical and security threats facing
this fragile region have risen to the top of the agenda.
The
EU summit conclusions expressed concern on both external and internal factors,
referring to a recent flare-up in nationalist rhetoric and ethnic tensions in
this post-conflict region. European Council President Donald Tusk was quoted as
saying some of the ethnic divisions that have
existed in several countries for some time have spiked due to destabilizing
external influences. This was a veiled reference to Russia, which has been
waging wider disinformation campaigns in Serbia and elsewhere in the region.
Tusk also called for EU institutions to take more action, including in the area
of strategic communications.
The
reasons are simple: an erosion of strategic engagement, attention and political
will in key EU capitals. While Europe neglects the Balkans, and the new U. S.
Administration reorients foreign policy, other powers moved in to fill the
vacuum. This post-conflict corner in south eastern Europe
has again become a zone for competing geopolitical struggles.
The
EU
Observer correctly noted
that the EU capitals are also wary of Turkey and Gulf Arab states’ efforts to
increase political influence in the region, but Russia’s behaviour is seen as
more destabilising and dangerous. The Kremlin’s
assertive presence in the Balkans presents a low-risk option for an early test
of transatlantic relations under the new American President Donald Trump.
Multiple alarm bells
Multiple alarm bells have sounded in recent weeks and months.
The real game changer in the outside perception of Moscow’s meddling in the
region was an attempted coup in Montenegro during parliamentary elections in
October 2016. Many observers were initially sceptical about the official claims
from Podgorica that local security service narrowly prevented a group of
Serbian ultranationalists and paramilitary fighters (with recent experience
from the Donbass) organized from Russia from storming the parliament and
helping to disrupt the elections, and thus discredit the ratification process
of Montenegro’s membership in NATO. Then Montenegro presented evidence, which
was partly gathered thanks to cooperation with Serbian authorities (the
perpetrators initially operated from Serbian territory). Pro-Russian opposition parties still bitterly contest the claim. Nevertheless, presented
evidence confirms the long-term trend. This was also pointed out by British
Foreign Minister Boris Johnson who only a few days ago openly called on the Kremlin
to stop undermining pro-Western leaders and governments in the Balkans.
Of more immediate concern is the deep, prolonged crisis gripping
Macedonia. With street
protests in Skopje and a constitutional crisis over the results of the December
election, Russian government and media have claimed that the EU is trying to
create a Greater Albania – a clear attempt to aggravate ethnic tension in this fragile
country with a 25% ethnic Albanian minority,
playing into the hands of former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski who is trying
to remain in power. Russia is also backing another controversial strongman, the
nationalist president of Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian Serb entity, who is
pushing for a referendum on RS independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Return
of geopolitics benefited Balkan strongmen
This
return of geopolitics,
however, has also benefited Balkan leaders, allowing them to pander to various
geopolitical players or investors, and play this ‘chess game’ as a cover for expanding
their own power and patronage networks. They can more easily disregard
democratic standards and politically conditionality, which has always been part
of the EU’s enlargement process (when it still had more credibility).
Nowhere
else is this contradiction more clearly displayed than in Serbia - the largest Balkan
country, which is now the lynchpin of stability for the whole region. The pro-EU course, which has long dominated Belgrade’s geostrategic
orientation, has recently been confronted with a growing Russian influence in
domestic politics, business and public opinion. However, events in Montenegro
seemed to reach a tipping point: Serbia’s Prime Minister Aleksandar
Vucic, who has evolved from a former hard-line
nationalist into a pro-EU leader and pragmatist, took it as a warning.
Serbia
as trendsetter?
After period characterized by rumours and speculation,
47-year old Vucic decided to run in Presidential elections in April 2017. He
thus outmanoeuvred the current president Tomislav
Nikolic, a key ally of Moscow. 65-years old Nikolic was former political mentor
of Vucic, and a founder of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). At the
same time, he has remained a traditional hard-line nationalist with strong ties
to Russia. He once famously said that the only thing he loves more than Russia,
is Serbia.
Vucic knows that trading the top government job for a mostly
ceremonial position of President with few
constitutional powers does not matter. If he finds a suitable replacement as
Prime Minister, even as President he will remain the country’s strongman. It is
in line with Serbian political tradition inherited from the era of Tito
and Milosevic (when informal power mattered much more than formal competences and
institutions).
Meanwhile, the fragmented
Serbian democratic camp has failed to present a single candidate: three
contenders are now competing for similar voters in what is more a side-show
beauty pageant for the leader of the opposition and chief opponent to Vucic.
His election for Serbian President is already taken as a foregone conclusion. There
are two open questions: whether Prime Minister Vucic will win a straight majority
already in the first round, and if not, who would be his contender in a run-off.
A second round of elections would be somewhat humiliating for Vucic. The effect
of a split vote among the mainstream opposition might help the notorious
extreme nationalist leader Vojislav Seselj. In a way, he would be the ideal
opponent for both Prime Minister Vucic and Russia. Moscow initially preferred
the status quo (new mandate for President Nikolic) but now would be satisfied
with boosting their preferred narrative (e.g. Serbia betrayed by the West
should turn to Russia) during the election campaign using the platform of hardline
nationalists.
Business as usual
won’t work
As much as the EU (as
well as the new U. S. Administration) now rely on Vucic, they can’t ignore his increasingly
undemocratic track record, especially when global and regional influences encourage
him to tighten his trip. At the same time, the EU’s leverage is not something
to be ignored. While Brussels and Berlin need him as partner on strategic
regional issues, migration, and Kosovo, it also goes the other way around:
Serbia’s evasive strongman also needs the EU, and Berlin and Washington in
particular, to calm the waters, keep Russia at bay and credibly reengage the whole
region.
To sum up: the latest EU
summit was a step in the right direction if it is not followed by complacency.
Continuing with a ‘business as usual’ approach to the Balkans will not work
anymore as competing
geopolitical struggles take the main stage.
Milan Nič
Head of Future of Europe Programme
Head of Future of Europe Programme
GLOBSEC Policy Institute
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