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| (Photo: Twitter) |
On 1 August 2017 in Skopje—under an increased
police presence on the streets—the governments of the Republic of
Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) signed a Treaty for Good
Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation. While the name itself
does not suggest a ground-breaking accomplishment, this Treaty has been in the
making since 1999. What has changed for both countries to finally agree on
a binding common text?
Bulgaria was the first to recognise Republic of
Macedonia as an independent nation- state in 1992. As often in the Balkans
history, traditions, culture and language are intertwined and complicated
matters. Relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia has been
deteriorating based on disagreements about historical events and personalities,
recognition of the Macedonian language and, further, the recognition of
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and Bulgarian minority in Macedonia.
In 1999 the two governments signed a Joint
Declaration of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation. Note that this
was not a binding document—necessary to be ratified in the respective
parliaments. Such agreement would not have passed through at the time. Still,
the language was bold with two important concessions. First, the Joint Declaration
was signed in two original copies, one in Bulgarian language, as defined by the
Constitution of Bulgaria and one in Macedonian language, as defined by the
Constitution of Macedonia. In practice, the Bulgarian government did not
recognise the Macedonian language, but it recognised its defined use within
Macedonia. Second, in the Declaration was included the assurance that
Macedonia, through its Constitution, does not seek to interfere in the internal
politics of Bulgaria as it pertains to people living in Bulgaria that are not
Macedonian citizens. Why was this inclusion sought after? Article 49 of the
Macedonian Constitution refers to the protection of Macedonians living in
Greece and Bulgaria—proclaiming the existence of Macedonian minorities. The
non-binding Joint Declaration, as predicted, did not ease the tensions.
Different political entities, intellectual circles, social movements and the
governments themselves continued to fume over unresolved issues.
Fast forward to 2017. The current government
in Macedonia is attempting to distance itself from the past politics and
policies. It seeks to re-start the bids for NATO and EU membership and
to strengthen (grow) its economy and increase financial flows. It also appears
to work towards regaining the trust of Western institutions and investors.
Macedonia was blocked in the past by Greece in their attempt to join NATO (as
part of their conflict over the official name of Republic of Macedonia) and the
outlook to EU accession has also been rather grim. In 2017 the government in
Macedonia has changed after more than ten years (2006- 2016) in the hands of
Nikola Gruevski (VMRO- DPMNE) and a year of political crisis. The new prime
minister Zoran Zaev (Social Democratic Party) was chosen amid an attack on the
Parliament by an angry mob (suspected to be encouraged by different domestic
and foreign influences). The country found itself in the world news but for the
wrong reasons, revealing a polarised society with high tensions between the
ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, lagging economy and infrastructure,
and political crisis.
Meanwhile, Bulgaria did become a member of NATO and
the EU (even if among the poorest). Without suggesting that Bulgaria has done
an excellent job—certainly it is lagging in many areas to the other EU
members—the country has stayed internally stable and away from serious ethnic
tensions (with 8% ethnic Turkish and 4.5% Roma population). More
importantly, the Bulgarian government is preparing for the Presidency of the
Council of the European Union in 2018. One of its main priorities is
to deliver “tangible European perspective for all Western Balkan countries.”
The government is eager to show its ability to resolve issues, without outside
mediation, and the ability to be a leader. Additionally, the Bulgarian
government will be pursuing during the Presidency its own national interests,
including entry into the Schengen zone, entry into ERM II and favourable
allocation of European funds in the new post- 2020 period. Already in July 2017,
the prime minister of Bulgaria Boyko Borisov met with his counterpart Zoran
Zaev in Sofia to negotiate the Treaty. Days later he was in Athens meeting with
the prime ministers of Greece and Serbia to discuss closer relations on the
Balkans and perhaps mediating support for Republic of Macedonia.
What is in the new Treaty? It is heavily based on the
Joint Declaration from 1999. Yet, there are several important points to be
noted. First, there is an attempt to address long-standing issues with
the interpretation of history by both countries. The history of
Bulgaria and Macedonia has been referred as “common” and joined celebrations
are planned. A joint committee will be created to tackle historical questions
(certain pessimism is present about the vitality of such committee). Second,
the question about the official recognition of respective minorities is left
unresolved. The Treaty states that each country can protect the rights
of its citizens (not minorities) in accordance to the international law. Third,
the Bulgarian government will officially and openly lobby for Macedonia to
become a member of NATO and the EU. Fourth, several statements commit the
governments to work on regional projects and toward more liberalised market. These
commitments are perhaps among the most substantive in the Treaty. Both,
Bulgaria and Macedonia seek improvements of their infrastructure (opportunity
to receive European funds and corporate investments) and to grow their
economies (freer movement of goods, services, capital and people). It is not
surprising that two additional Memorandums were signed at the ceremony on 1
August. One Memorandum concerns the building of Corridor 8—an intermodal
Pan-European transportation infrastructure that connects Italy, Albania,
Macedonia and Bulgaria. The other Memorandum deals with possibilities in
building gas connection.
So, what is next? The signing of the Treaty was not
an international sensation with no mentioning on BBC or CNN, for example. Yet,
Federica Mogherini’s office (High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security) was delighted to hear the news, so were the US State
Department and the government of Germany. Logically, Western
governments and institutions feel as Macedonia, at least for now, will not slip
away under Russian and/or nationalistic influences. Some questions
remain, however. Within Macedonia, the Treaty has been accepted with mixed
feelings. The main disagreements regarding language and minority protections
have not been resolved. Greece is also uneasy about the change of balance in
relations on the Balkans, as Bulgaria is attempting to rise as a regional
leader. Russia has been relatively quiet but they do not favour any further
enlargements of NATO and the EU. In the end, the next year will show us if the
Treaty will have a practical effect and the good intentions will not stay only
on paper. If Bulgaria manages to use its Presidency wisely, regarding
its commitment to the Western Balkans, then we might see indeed a renewed
European interest of the region and a new regional leader. Then again,
the never ending and complicated historical, cultural and linguistic
disagreements on the Balkans have been time and time again serving as
significant barriers to its successful development…
Vladislava
Gubalova
Future of
Europe Programme
GLOBSEC
Policy Institute
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