(Cars burnt and destroyed by
clashes are seen on a street during a battle between Iraqi forces and Islamic
State militants, in Mosul. Photo: REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani)
What a difference three years
make. In 2014, we saw Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the so-called “Caliph” of the
so-called Islamic State, lead prayers at the Mosul’s Great Mosque. In July 2017,
the same mosque is in ruins and the Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, “
announce[s] […] the end and the failure and the collapse of the terrorist state
of falsehood and terrorism which the terrorist Daesh [Islamist
State/ISIS/ISIL] announced from Mosul.”
Of course, prime minister al-Abadi is not completely right. ISIS still controls (some) territory and its ‘capital’ of Raqqa is still holding. Nonetheless, discussions already abound as ‘what comes after ISIS.’ All seem to agree that ISIS, in some way, shape or form, will live on, and that it will probably morph into a terrorist organisation, no longer able to control territory. At the same time, many stress the fact that even its defeat, or in reality – weakening, will not solve all of the Middle Eastern, or even Iraqi or Syrian problems. Others also underscore the threat from its non-Middle Eastern members who seemingly stand ready to e.g. return to Europe and stage series of more or less spectacular terrorist attacks, while linking up with the local ISIS sympathisers. In short, things will not get much better, expect further trouble and do not rejoice.
Of course, prime minister al-Abadi is not completely right. ISIS still controls (some) territory and its ‘capital’ of Raqqa is still holding. Nonetheless, discussions already abound as ‘what comes after ISIS.’ All seem to agree that ISIS, in some way, shape or form, will live on, and that it will probably morph into a terrorist organisation, no longer able to control territory. At the same time, many stress the fact that even its defeat, or in reality – weakening, will not solve all of the Middle Eastern, or even Iraqi or Syrian problems. Others also underscore the threat from its non-Middle Eastern members who seemingly stand ready to e.g. return to Europe and stage series of more or less spectacular terrorist attacks, while linking up with the local ISIS sympathisers. In short, things will not get much better, expect further trouble and do not rejoice.
One thing which I feel has not
yet been stressed enough in these deliberations, although
Peter Neumann raised this issue at this year’s GLOBSEC, is the fact that we
probably underestimate the effect of
ISIS on the future of global jihadism, and as a consequence, international
or global terrorism. Regardless of whether the Caliphate will survive another
year, it will – at least, in a skeletal form, some of its alumni, either Iraqi,
Syrian or “foreign fighters,” will
be the leaders of the next generation(s)
of jihadists. They will be the role models, the ones to which younger
followers look up to, they will act as force
multipliers for different, smaller jihads around the globe, and finally,
they will plot, scheme and sometimes, stage spectacular terrorist attacks. Yes,
many will die in the meantime, others will be intercepted by different police
forces and security services but some will survive and continue their terrorist
careers in different countries or organisations. They will bring all of their
expertise and especially their contacts, and networks with them. Last but not
least, potentially, there are thousands of candidates for such jihadist
conveyor belts, with more than 12 -15 000 foreign
fighters present in the ranks of
ISIS in March 2017 alone plus thousands of Iraqis and Syrians fighting for
the organisation on different fronts.
To appreciate this point, simply
consider the career of one individual – the current leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri. His involvement in
conspiratorial, clandestine anti-state activity dates back to the mid-1960s. He
led one jihadist organisation, Egyptian Islamic Jihad which then merged with
Al-Qaeda in 2001, as early as 1981. He has been leading the latter organisation
for six years already. His is a life in jihad, and the jihadist milieu is full
of individuals who have a peculiar tendency to re-appear or re-invent themselves after years of seeming
inactivity. Perhaps, we should actually be saying that they have never become inactive (see e.g.: the
case of the Frenchman, Boubaker
el-Hakim, active in jihadist circles between 2002 and 2016, veteran of two
Iraq wars, with a spell of imprisonment in between, associated with Al-Qaeda,
and then ISIS), and are poised to come back at some point in the future.
Taking this into account, should
convince us that focusing on ISIS’
longevity, and its presumed imminent doom, may not be the most effective way forward. There is no point crying
over spilt milk. Let us focus on the afterlives
of ISIS members, and their future careers. They will still be with us, and
some might emerge as the not-so-surprising jihadi trend setters in the future. We cannot lose track of them. From a
European perspective, this is far more important than whether the “Caliphate”
turns four next year. Of course, it will and some of its alumni are already plotting
their post-ISIS lives.
Kacper Rekawek
Head of Defence and Security Programme
GLOBSEC Policy Institute
