A leap away from the EU, a leap towards Turulism?

(Photo: Flickr|EPP, licensed by CC BY 2.0)

To be proud of your nation and cultural heritage is common, it is even desired and understandable. Some, however, fall into the passions of ultranationalism. In the case of Hungarians, this phenomenon might be called turulism. 

The referendum on the EU quota on the resettlement of refugees in Hungary—is passionately discussed nowadays. The stakes are high and we all wish for clear answers of what is happening in Hungary. Is Orbán the savior or the annihilator?

Let us first repeat the crucial question that was asked on the 2^nd of October: Do you want the European Union to be able to mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of the National Assembly? (Translation from Wikipedia.)

The attendance at the referendum was 43,80%, which is less than needed for it to be legally binding. According to the official results, 39,8% of the votes were valid, while 6,33% were invalid (more than 218 thousand). Fully 98,28% voted against the quotas (3,282 million voters out of the 9,937 million population) in contrast to the 1,72% who voted in favor a of them.

On 5^th October Bence Tuzson, Communication State Secretary at the Prime Minister's Cabinet Office announced that the government will incorporate the results of the referendum into the Constitution as over three million people supported the position of the government. However, 57,2% ignored the referendum thus it is hard to say that the government is acting in favor of the whole or at least the majority of the population. Plus, 6.33% of the votes were invalid, which could be understood as a form of protest while keeping the civil obligations. On 10^th October PM Orbán submitted the Constitutional amendment—saying that no foreign citizen can be relocated to Hungary through obligatory resettlement. All immigrants and asylum seekers must be evaluated individually except for citizens of the European Economic Area, which are excluded from this rule.  

The government believes that the suggested five Constitutional amendments would create a “new unity” of Hungarians . The main goal is to anchor the constitutional identity of Hungary which should be protected on all state levels. Indeed, the “new unity” will include statements regarding territory and population. The government wishes to base their claim that the nation state should be the basis for European decisions, and not vice versa, on constitutional grounds.. This is not building on the principle of synergy between EU and nation state interests but rather intends to build a hierarchy. Orbán´s government says it is taking the Hungarian spiritual essence under its protective wings to shield it against those who threaten Europe—and against Brussels´ dictate.  Whether it will be approved is a hard question.  For passing thought the Parliament the amendment has to be approved by a 2/3 majority. The far right Jobbik might secure the needed majority for FIDESZ, the support is already announced. Broader discussion within the Parliament about the concrete text is scheduled for 17^th October. We will see on 8^th November whether FIDESZ’s attempt for the seventh constitutional change will be another success.

The referendum itself has less of a legal affects than a political one. The international media is strongly criticizing Orbán´s referendum. As John Dalhuisen, the Director of Amnesty International said, “Prime Minister Orbán has replaces the rule of law with the rule of fear”.  And yes, fear was systematically fed by the campaign itself. Statements such as “we love our country” and “we do not allow our daughters and wives to be raped by immigrants” were only some of the many slogans used during the campaign. Even the “Roma card” was used in an unexpected way: the campaign threatened that migrants will steal the chance for a decent life for the Roma living in Hungary – as stated by Roma representatives close to the government.

Mass hysteria was fed by oversimplifications, the degradation of more complex views into black-and-white viewpoints, omnipresent xenophobia all served the rhetorical needs of officials. But, in fact, the general population has no real interaction with refugees or migrants (if we do not include their transition through the country). One of the opposition voices, the Kétfarkú Kutya Párt satirically pointed out in a question on a billboard set up in response to the official referendum campaign: “did you know? A common Hungarian sees more UFOs than migrants during their lifetime”.

Who really profited from the historically most expensive referendum (estimated to cost approx. 42,816 million Euros)? It was reported that two days after the referendum new billboards were placed in Budapest —exactly the same as prior to the referendum, repeating the appeal to vote for NO. What is the legitimacy behind placing outdated billboards on the street? The anti-migrant campaign continues after the referendum and does not lose its intensity.

On the 5^th of October after the bomb attack in Budapest the Government decided to launch a several-day-long counter-terrorism exercise in the Puskás Ferenc metro station by simulating a real-life terrorist attack. The simulation included men, women and children acting as terrorists and victims, with shouts of Allahu Akbar. V4 officials and other prominent guests were invited to observe this exercise.

In addition to fearmongering, the government always sees on calling on the sorrows of Hungarian history as a winning strategy . One of the examples used by Hungarian officials goes like this: Hungary has always faced difficulties alone, especially those imposed by foreign powers (such as the 1956 uprising). Doing what is right and needed is often judged in the present but only the future will show that righteousness is on the Hungarian side. Indeed, the fire of the heart fed by these sentiments can often blur the facts that are on the table.

However, let´s look now at the European dimension of the whole quota-related problem. The passionately discussed quotas were introduced for the sake of solidarity within the EU, aiming to reduce the sudden burden of countries being closer to the conflict zones or being at the Schengen border as EU countries would share the evaluation process of asylum seekers. It does not mean that Brussels is imposing forceful relocation. Asylum applications would be assessed according to national law by national officials.

In a recent letter from Donald Tusk in December 2015, Orbán agreed with the European Council about all the suggested quick measurements regarding asylum seekers. In addition, the EU itself agreed that the project of obligatory quotas came to a dead end at the Bratislava Summit in September. Solidarity among EU member countries will now be on different terms. So, why was the referendum necessary? Who benefited from it and how?

The media was saturated with the campaign. As a result, the majority of other crucial issues, such as corruption, cronyism, insufficient healthcare and the schooling system were marginalized.

Orbán is building up his arsenal of voters based on mild (or at least milder than Jobbik) turulist rhetoric. Simply because it works. Turulism has always been present in the Hungarian society, even before joining the EU club. In fact, neither the referendum nor the Constitutional amendment will bring any significant change. Nevertheless, even though it might be perceived that way, it is not an attempt to disintegrate the EU and there won´t be a HUXIT. Hungarians are proud members of the EU. For other populist leaders across Europe who are following the model of illiberal democracy this might be different, meaning they might appeal for exiting the EU. Indeed, this cannot be applied for Hungary—so far.

Alexandra Tóthová

A Bomb in Budapest: “New” Europe and Terrorism

On 24^th September, Saturday, explosion ripped through the centre of Budapest and seriously injured two policemen. The blast occurred a week before the country goes to the polls to vote in the controversial migrant quota referendum. The social media chatter immediately connected the bombing with the referendum as some attempted to blame the government for staging the attack so that it could be seen as a victim of ISIS terrorism, just like France and Germany. This, if the perpetrator was to be a Muslim refugee/immigrant, was to allegedly underscore the case for voting “no” in the upcoming referendum and thus deliver a political success for prime minister Orban.

However, this was not the only conspiracy theory on the origins of the Budapest blast peddled by the social media. Orban’s followers also had a field day. They accused the “left” or the “liberals” of staging the attack so they could later claim that the government had really been responsible for the bombing. This interpretation of the event would “allegedly” be looked upon favourably by the international media which remain extremely suspicious of the Hungarian government.

Either way, many claimed this was a cover-up which was meticulously planned and timed. [footnote: The proponents of both conspiracies received a blow when on 26 September prime minister Orban indicated that there was no link between the attack and the migration crisis].

Thankfully, the Hungarian media and especially its police would not involve themselves in such deliberations. The police is still searching for the perpetrator and steers away, so far, from politicizing the issue. Its chief indicated that terrorist motive is one of the lines of inquiry his force is pursuing in relation to the blast.

One could say that this is an unprecedented event in recent Hungarian or Central European (CE), Central-Eastern European (CEE) history as terrorism seemed to have hardly made an impact on this part of Europe. There simply were no high profile attacks, elaborate plots or spectacular arrests of terrorist operatives for terrorism researchers to study and for the general public to even notice the phenomenon.

The Budapest blast, however, is not the first act of terrorism in CE(E). While studying it and considering its implications or timing, let’s remind ourselves of two major facts related to this phenomenon’s history and development in the region:

1. This is not the first act of terrorism in Central Europe, Central-Eastern Europe, or post-communist “new EU.” Remember Burgas bombing in Bulgaria from 2012 where 7 people were killed. And this is just the tip of the iceberg (see here for an outline of terrorist activity in the region). Yes, most of it was not violent in nature as terrorists gathered intelligence or worked towards providing material support to their parent organisations or groups.

2. Despite the data (always contentious) provided by “new” EU Member States to Europol (see e.g. here for a snapshot of terrorism attacks, arrests and convictions in all Member States), this part of Europe is not “terrorism free.” Of course, it suffers from far, far less terrorism than Western Europe or the “old’ EU but it had its share of:

a)     hoaxes, bomb scares, more or less credible news of elaborate plots being prepared – Warsaw 2005, Prague 2006.

b)     Attempted or successful Lone wolf attacks – shooting in Estonia’s ministry of defence in 2011; an attempt to target Slovenian Prime Minister by a citizen of Croatia in 2009; bombing of McDonald’s in Kosice, Slovakia in 2011.

c)     Far-right terrorism akin to Germany’s National Socialist Underground (Hungary 2008-09) – targeting Roma, just like their German counterparts, the terrorists had links with the local security services.

d)     Hostage dramas as the inhabitants of the region found themselves kidnapped by terrorist organisations or in regions with high level of terrorist activity (Poland 2008, Czech Republic 2013, Estonia 2012,  Hungary 2012).

e)     Prolonged courtroom sagas (Poland 2012, Lithuania 2009-2010) related to attempted terrorist attacks.

f)      Re-emergence of the foreign fighter phenomenon (remember, Poles have been involved in going to foreign wars from at least late 18^th century, the country’s national anthem is a song of foreign fighters), this time in relation to Islamist militancy abroad (and also the conflict in Ukraine). Although the statistics from “new” EU Member States (e.g. Poland: 20-40, Slovakia: 8) show, just like the Europol data, that the region’s experience with this phenomenon bears little resemblance to the French or Belgian ordeal, it nonetheless appears to be gaining recognition and traction. One Polish jihadi returnee from Syria will go on trial later this year or early new year. It is now certain that he met other likeminded Islamists in Poland, most probably at a mosque in Warsaw, and together they travelled to Syria.

g)     ISIS or ISIS sympathisers activity: 2015 saw arrests of what was dubbed a “logistics cell” performing fundraising activities for “brothers in Syria” in Poland.

h)     Bombings – yes, a surprise but there were also others bombings in the “new” EU, and not just the recent blast in Budapest or the aforementioned 2011 Kosice bombing of a McDonald’s restaurant. There was a spate of (e.g. more than 80 in 1995 in Estonia alone) bombings in the region in the aftermath of 1989 as different criminal syndicates fought never-ending turf wars.

The Budapest bombing (termed #Budapestexplosion in social media), if terrorist in nature, is a new for the “new” Europe but it comes on top of other terrorism developments. Consequently, we should not be surprised that a growing number of individuals or groups will utilize this method of warfare for accomplishing political goals. In the last couple of years, quite a few already tried to stage their own “Budapest explosions” before someone actually succeeded in doing that. Unfortunately, more will follow.

Kacper Rekawek

Head of Defence and Security Programme, GLOBSEC Policy Institute

Western Balkans in times of the EU existential turmoil

How to make sense of the EU enlargement cause amidst great uncertainty over the future course of the European Union after Brexit? Can the Western Balkans avoid the disintegration and conflict exacerbated by fraying Transatlantic and European bonds? These and other questions were addressed by over 30 political analysts and experts from around the EU and South-eastern Europe over a workshop organized by the Belgrade-based European Fund for the Balkans in September 16-18, 2016 in Opatija, Croatia.

When the Brainstorming with the Balkan Advisory Group (BIEPAG) met in early 2016, we discussed gradual eroding of the EU perspective for the region (‘loss of the paradigm’). EU Enlargement was seen as still dominant political discourse on the surface while in fact it was becoming only a formal reference (or mantra) providing ‘external legitimacy’ but without much policy substance in the respected Balkan accession or pre-accession countries.

A lot has happened in the past few months: the UK vote to leave the EU, presidential candidacy of Donald Trump, the increased popularity of the anti-establishment, anti-immigrant and far right parties across the EU, frequent ISIS-inspired terrorist acts in Western Europe, or consolidation of authoritarian regime in Turkey come to mind. As Florian Bieber, Director of the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University in Graz pointed out, the resulting effect is more inward looking EU, and lower attractiveness of the enlargement and liberal democracy. ‘Not that the geopolitical challenges are strong but the European offer is so weak’. Furthermore, the potential electoral success of far-right parties in upcoming elections in Austria, Netherlands and France will have clear negative repercussions: they oppose the EU project and reject enlargement. This symbiotic relationship between authoritarian strongman outside the EU and eurosceptics within it is likely to strengthen in the near future.

However, as the source and engine of crisis lies primarily in the EU itself, reform processes in the WB6 countries – all at different stages of European integration - have to be driven more from within. This is not likely to happen: EU conditionality and leverage through the enlargement process, plus the US diplomatic muscle and NATO’ as security provider have been the pillars of progress and stability in this post-conflict region over the past two decades.  As all of these outside actors are now less able or willing to play a decisive role, Balkan strongmen are more on their own – and willing to drag their feet, as it in the continued, deep internal crisis in Macedonia.

Yet, as other participants pointed out, people working on the Balkans in the EU institutions – or in NATO, for that matter - sound much more up-beat and optimistic in their assessments. In July, few weeks after Brexit, Serbia has opened two key chapters in the EU membership talks, Montenegro is slightly ahead (as it is becoming full member of NATO), and Albania on the right path to start membership talks next year, if it implements the justice reform. Some minor achievements came also from ethnically divided laggards – Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Even amidst the current EU turmoil, there still are huge majorities in support of joining the Union in all six Western Balkan countries. So the enlargement train is moving on, Brexit will not stop it. In a long-term run, the EU Commission officials are convinced that ‘enlargement process by stealth’ will work, although it might take more time – perhaps 15 years rather than eight as in the case of Croatia. But will there still be a Union to join in 2030? Or are these officials like captains at the enlargement Titanic which is slowly sinking?    

This moment of EU’s existential crisis is perhaps a very good moment to start thinking outside of the box about the future of this non-integrated, fragmented south-eastern European enclave of some 20 million people living in six small states: what might be an alternative strategy to the EU enlargement? How can we re-think our approach if a more differentiated, multispeed Europe takes concrete shape in the near future? How can we incentivise more reforms and economic modernisation even without the pre-accession IPA funds? How can we incentivise more regional cooperation and further progress towards good neighbourly relations even when mutual hostilities from recent conflicts are still alive? Stay tuned for analysis of these and other questions, which were put forward for the EFB's Balkan Advisory Group to work on for the next period.

Milan Nič

Head of Future of Europe Programme

GLOBSEC Policy Institute

What does the Bratislava Summit have to say about Russia?

Nothing and a lot.

There will be no grand joint statement on relations with Russia when 27 leaders convene in Bratislava on Friday.

And that’s not only because it’s an “informal” summit. The Summit is expected to focus on areas that the 28-1 leaders can agree on. Relations with Russia is not one of them.

The imposing of sanctions has been the rare measure in which EU member states could agree on a common position leading to clear policies. As the Minsk agreements have not yet been implemented, there is no push for an immediate reversal of sanctions ahead of the next revision scheduled for January 2017. But attitudes vary greatly across member states.

Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, and others with close economic ties to Russia were only just convinced to support sanctions in the first place. Given the smaller than expected effects of sanctions on Russia and the negative repercussion on the economies of many member states, countries have not grown any more fond of the policy.

The UK, the traditional hardliner on Russia in the EU, will not be part of Friday’s talks and will naturally play a smaller role in EU foreign policy. Moreover, Russia has welcomed Boris Johnson as a foreign minister who may be able to normalize relations between the countries.

With a range of other pressing issues on the agenda, there is little reason for the EU to rush into another murky internal disagreement and attempt to revise its policy on Russia.

Nevertheless, the ghost of Russia will be looming over the discussions. That is not because Russia holds parliamentary elections two days after the summit. Due to the carefully crafted system and internal skirmishes of the opposition, the elections won’t change the make-up of the Duma.

But Russia’s alleged influence on fundamental developments in Europe – from populism to the rise of the far right to the migration crisis – is so significant that Russia will earn at least a (dis)honorable mention in each of the topics on the agenda.

First, the EU leaders are looking for ways to reinstate trust in the European project. This implies addressing populism, nationalism, growing suspicions towards elites, and the rise of far-right and fringe parties.

It is hard to avoid discussing the purported Russian footprint on these issues. The questionable portrayal of events by Kremlin-backed media and Russian financial support of far-right and fringe parties aggravate the situation in Europe make the task of resurrecting trust in democracy ever more daunting.

The growing discontent with globalization and the associated fear of economic and social instability makes the European public question the viability of the liberal democratic model the EU advocates. With the help of media, Russia has come across as a potential alternative to the part of the European public that feels neglected and marginalized.

On the other hand, as EU leaders seek to boost economic growth, it might be worth thinking through potential new modes of relations with Russia. The idea of a “trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok” already started to be floated around again in the summer. The Commission seems to be more open than ever to talking directly to its Eurasian Economic Union counterpart. Although the possibility of a continental trade partnership rests in the distant future, an innovative upgrade of a partnership and cooperation agreement and liberalization of the visa regime with Russia might bring economic benefits for both sides in the near future.

Of course, all these scenarios are conditioned on the implementation of the Minsk agreements and a better compliance with international rules by Russia. The ceasefire in Syria announced by the US and Russia on September 10, if implemented, might be – or might not be – a sign of Kremlin’s willingness to demonstrate the latter.

Third, the EU should factor in Russia while deliberating on internal security. Organized crime stemming from or with links to post-Soviet countries is a concern in the EU. Linking it to the Russian government might be too big of a stretch and hard to prove. But the EU must increase cooperation with Russian authorities to combat crime networks.

Moreover, a family of “Bears”, cozy and fancy, – hackers allegedly connected to Kremlin – are a growing headache to cybersecurity officials in the EU. Hacking of governance systems and critical infrastructure is a threat that can no longer be downplayed.

Fourth, the situation in Eastern Ukraine is extremely fragile. With dozens dying monthly, all sides accusing each other of “subversion” or even “terrorism” and Russia amassing its troops next to the Ukrainian border, there is a risk that the flows of those fleeing conflict will intensify.

“Principled pragmatism” is in fashion today. The EU made its principled statement on Russia in July and will not deliver another one on Friday. Now crucial pragmatic steps, even if less visible, might serve the EU better. These steps would include improved cooperation between intelligence services and police across Europe to address organized crime and other security threats; boosting cyber-defense capabilities and improving integration of EU cyberspace; monitoring Russian moves regarding Ukraine, while also pushing Ukraine to speed up reforms and deliver on its part of the Minsk agreements; and consideration of new modes of economic and trade partnerships.

Alena Kudzko

Deputy Director of Globsec Policy Institute